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A Reexamination of the Distinction between "Loss-Allocating"
and "Conduct-Regulating Rules"
Wendy Collins Perdue"
The Louisiana choice of law code, drafted under the leadership of Dean
Symeonides, is an important effort to codify the best of modem conflicts
understanding. I routinely teach it to my conflicts students even though few will
practice in Lo\lisiana. I think it quite possible that someday states that have
followed more ad hoc judicial codifications 1 may consider adopting the more
systematic codification found in Louisiana.
The basic philosophy underlying the Louisiana choice oflawcode is set forth
in Louisiana Civil Code article 3515, which calls for the application of the laws of
"the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied to that issue. " 2 The remainder of the codification is an effort to delineate
how this general principle applies in different substantive areas. The starting point
for building these specific rules is an understanding of the policies underlying the
particular substantive area of law. The Louisiana choice of law code for torts3
provides an excellent illustration of this approach. The tort rules also
illustrate that a set of choice of law rules built around particular assumptions about
the substantive law may not work as expected if those substantive assumptions
prove incorrect.
The Louisiana choice of law articles on torts4 incorporate a distinction, first
developed in New Yorlc, s between tort rules that are conduct-regulating and those
that are loss-allocating. The distinction has been described as "one of the few
breakthroughs in modem American conflicts law.'o6 The basic rule is, as to laws
that are conduct-regulating, to apply the law of the place of conduct, and, as to laws
that are loss-allocating and the parties are from the same state, to apply the law of
the common domicile. Dean Symeonides has succinctly explained the basic
rationale behind the distinction: "most reasonable people can agree that conductregulating rules are territorially oriented, whereas compensation and lossdistributing rules usu~lly are not territorially oriented."7 This conflicts rule is built
around the premise that there are two fundamental purposes of tort law-deterrence
Copyright 2000, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Perdue
co-authored a casebook on conflict oflaws with Dean Symeonides and Arthur von Mehren, see Conflict
of Laws: American, Comparative, International (1998), and gratefully acknowledges all that Dean
Symeonides has taught her about choice of law. She also thanks Lynn Stout and Carlos Vazquez for
their comments on this paper.
1. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (1972).
2. La. Civ. Code. art. 3515.
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 3542-3548.
4. /d.
5. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
6. Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677, 705 (1992).
7. Id. at 703.
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and compensation-and that all tort rules can meaningfully be classified as serving
one of those two purposes. 8 For example, the drafters of the code expected that
rules such as caps on damages or immunity from suit would be treated as lossallocating and rules such as "rules of the road" would be treated as conduct
regulating. 9
In this paper, I disagree with the premise that all tort rules can be meaningfully
classified as either compensatory or deterrent. I argue that most tort rules are both
and that "the compensation and deterrence goals ascribed to the tort system cannot
be separated. " 10 I then explore the impact on the Louisiana tort choice of law code
of this alternative understanding of tort law.
My analysis begins with the proposition that all tort rules are loss-allocating.
A liability rule shifts the loss from the injured victim to the tortfeasor; conversely
a rule of no liability means that the loss, no matter how real, will be borne by the
victim. All tort rules determine who will bear a loss and thus all are loss-allocating.
In addition to all tort rules being loss-allocating, I believe that most affect conduct.
The reason is directly tied to loss-allocation. Loss-allocation creates incentives for
those who must bear the loss to behave differently than they would if they did not
bear the loss. To the extent people respond to incentives, tort rules will affect
conduct. 11 As I note later in the paper, these effects on conduct may not always be
intended by the lawmaker, and in particular situations, the conduct effect of two
different rules may be quite small. Nonetheless, I believe there are few situations
in which one can conclude that a tort rule is inherently loss-allocating but not
conduct-regulating.
The difficulties of classification have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, Dean
Symeonides, with typical intellectual candor has acknowledged the problem12
but has admonished that "difficulty . . . is no excuse for abandoning the
judicial function." 13 However, if one accepts the view offered here that all
tort rules allocate loss and thereby affect conduct, then the classification
problem is not merely the result of insufficient diligence. The problem is more
fundamental.
The difficulties of classification can be illustrated with a brief examination of
several different categories of tort rules with which the courts have struggled.
These illustrations are not exhaustive but do highlight problems that are typical in
this area.

8.

ld.

9. Symeonides, supra note 6, at 699.
10. See Michael Trebilock,/ncentive Issues inthe Design of"No-Fault" Compensation Systems
39 U. Tor. L. J. 19, 20 (1989).
11. There are two situations in which rules are certain to have no impact on conduct. The first
is where the marginal demand for the conduct in question is inelastic. In this situation, people will
engage in the conduct no matter what the cost or consequences. Punishing an addict for taking drugs
is an example of this, though, of course, the punishment may have the effect of deterring others from
becoming addicted. The second situation is where application of the rule is completely unpredictable.
12. Symeonides, supra note 6, at 704.
13. ld. at 705 (quotingJagers v. Royal1ndem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309,313 (La. 1973)).
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Strict liability. One question on which the New York courts have split 14 is
whether a strict liability rule is conduct-regulating or loss-allocating. The court split
is not surprising. Strict liability is a classic example of a tort rule that both allocates
loss and affects conduct. Strict liability undeniably contains an element of
insurance or loss-allocation. 15 Under a negligence standard, victims are insured
against accidents that the defendant could have avoided with due care. Strict
liability expands the insurance component and insures the victim against all
accidents (including unavoidable ones). 16 Thus, strict liability is loss-allocating.
But strict liability is also conduct-regulating. A negligence rule creates an incentive for an actor to use due care. 17 A strict liability rule does not alter the incentives
concerning the level of care, 18 but instead creates an incentive to reduce the
level of an activity. 19 Consider, for example, a negligence versus a strict liability
rule concerning the liability of employers for accidents on scaffolds. 20 Under both
rules, the employer will have an incentive to take due care with respect to the
scaffold, and we would not predict any greater level of care under one rule than the
other. What would be different is that under a strict liability regime, we would
predict that employers will use fewer scaffolds. 21 Thus, in addition to
allocating loss, a strict liability rule is likely to affect conduct, though not the level
of care.
Limits on damages. A second category of rules that are both loss-allocating
and conduct-regulating are rules limiting damages. There are a variety oflaws that
limit the amount or type of damage that can be recovered. Examples include: caps
on pain and suffering, limits on wrongful death recoveries, and limits on what types
of losses will be covered, e.g., loss of consortium. One might easily characterize
these as loss-allocating since they obviously directly and explicitly determine how
much a party must pay. But these rules have significant impact on conduct. From
an economic perspective, it is the possibility of a damage award that causes an actor
to internalize the costs its conduct imposes on others. The level of damages that an
actor expects to pay directly affects the level of care the actor will take. 22 A
potential tortfeasor will take precautions so long as it is cheaper to take precautions
than to pay the expected damage award. 23 If the damages are low, then the amount

14. Compare Huston v. Hayden Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 617 N. Y.S.2d 335 (1994); Salsman
v. Barden & Robeson Corp., 564 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1990), with Calla v. Shulsky, 543 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1989)
and Aviles v. Port Auth., 615 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1994).
15. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 179 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Posner].
16. See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 66 (1987)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner].
17. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 64.
18. See id. at 64-66; see also Posner, supra note 15, at 175.
19. See Posner. supra note 15, at 176.
20. This is what was at issue in the cases about which the New York courts have split. See supra
note 14.
21. See Posner's discussion of a similar situation involving the liability of railroads for fires
caused by locomotive sparks, Posner, supra note 15, at 176-77.
22. See Steven Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 127-28 (1987).
23. See Posner, supra note 15, at 163-64.
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spent to avoid those damages will also be low. Thus, although damages limits have
an allocative effect, they also affect conduct.
Immunity. A third category of rules that are both loss-allocating and conductregulating are rules granting inununity to certain actors or for certain conduct. The
New York Court of Appeals has held that inununity is loss-allocating. 24 While it
clearly is that, it is also conduct regulating. Immunity is simply the flip side of strict
liability. 25 Under strict liability, if a tortfeasor engages in particular conduct and
harm results, that person is liable. The rule creates an incentive for the tortfeasor
to reduce the amount of that risk-creating conduct. Immunity puts the risk ofloss
entirely on the victim and thereby eliminates incentives for the tortfeasor to take
care and creates incentives for the victim both to take due care and to take
precautions to avoid the risk-creating activity. 26
The immunity at issue in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America was charitable
inununity. Both economic theory and recent political debates suggest that immunity
is conduct-regulating. The economic justification for charitable immunity is that
it allows charities to externalize some of their costs as a way ofincreasing charitable
sources. 27 It is conduct-regulating because it provides incentives for charities to
increase the quantity of service provided. The conduct-regulating characteristic of
charitable inununity is also apparent in the growing trend to provide inununity for
volunteers within charitable organizations. 28 A primary justification for these
statutes is that concerns about liability were discouraging volunteer participation. 29
Immunity is viewed as an incentive to encourage more people to volunteer with
charitable organizations. 30
States that have eliminated charitable inununity have concluded that the harm
from negligent charities outweighs the benefit of more charities. It is not the case,
however, as the dissenters imply in Schultz, 31 that non-inununity is conductregulating but immunity is not. Both inununity and non-inununity rules will affect
conduct. States that grant and deny inununity may be focusing on different
conduct. Immunity states may seek to increase charitable works while nonimmunity states may seek to decrease negligence. 32 Nonetheless, both rules affect
conduct.

24. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679,686 (N.Y. 1985).
25. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 63 ("strict liability is symmetrical with no liability").
26. See Posner, supra note 15, at 178.
27. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 181 n.5 I; Note, The Quality ofMercy: "Charitable
Torts·· and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1382, 1395 (1987).
28. See Charles Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 16 Cornell L. Rev.
401, 412 (1991 ); Note, supra note 27, at 1386.
29. See id. at 77.
30. See David Hartman, Volunteer Immunity: Maintaining the Vitality ofthe Third Sector ofOur
Economy, 10 U. Bridg. L. Rev. 63 (1989). There is some anecdotal evidence that concerns about
liability do in fact alter charitable activities. See Tremper, supra note 28, at 417.
3I. 480 N.E.2d at 691 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
32. It is also possible that an immunity state is motivated entirely by a concern for loss-allocation
and is either unaware of or indifferent to affects on conduct. This issue of motivation is addressed
below.
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Up to this point, I have argued that there are few, if any, tort rules that are
inherently loss-allocating but not conduct-regulating. Nonetheless, there are three
situations in which some tort rules can be said not to regulate conduct. The first is
where, despite an actual or theoretical effect on conduct, the intent or purpose is
entirely loss-allocating. If the goal of a choice of law rule is to implement the
policies of the underlying law, focus on intent is entirely appropriate. But this
technique will be helpful only where the purpose is uni-dimensional. Where the
purpose is both loss-allocation and conduct-regulation, I do not believe there is any
coherent methodology to determine which of multiple purposes is the more
important or significant.
An example of a rule with likely conduct effects but whose purpose may be
solely loss-allocation is no-fault automobile insurance. No-fault automobile
liability is generally justified as a form of insurance or loss-allocation. 33 There is
a plausible theoretical argument that most no-fault plans affect conduct and reduce
safety precautions34 and, indeed, there is also some empirical evidence to support
this theory. 35 Nonetheless, even if it is true that a particular no-fault scheme does
in fact result in less safe driving, it is unlikely that this was the purpose of the law.
Thus, suppose an accident occurred in a no-fault state that limited non-pecuniary
recovery and the accident involved people from a state that did not limit recovery.
One could conclude that the no-fault state was not trying to affect conduct (even if
it did), and so its policies would not be impacted by the application of the law of the
common domicile.
In trying to ascertain underlying purposes, one might conclude that all laws
which decrease the precautions taken by some people must always be lossallocating since no state would want to increase the risk of accidents. This
conclusion would be incorrect. A decrease in one side's obligations to prevent
ac::cidents puts the burden on the other party.36 For example, a rule that makes
railroads liable for all fires caused by its trains puts the burden of prevention on the
railroad. An alternative rule of no liability would put the burden entirely on
surrounding land owners. A state might adopt the no-liability rule because it
believed land owners were the most efficient accident avoiders. 37 Thus, by
decreasing the obligations for railroads to take care, the rule increases the incentives
for land owners to take care. There is no theoretical difference between the railroad
law and the no-fault insurance plans. No-fault automobile liability plans could have
the purpose of creating incentives for pedestrians to take care; the difference is
33. See Robert Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 5 (1965).
34. See Posner, supra note IS, at 205..()6; Trebilock, supra note 10, at 31-33.
35. See Elisabeth Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation of the Effect ofNo-fault Accidents, 25 J. Law & Econ. 49 (1982); Trebilock, supra note
I 0, at 28-30.
36. Similarly, as explained earlier, see text accompanying supra notes 18-20, strict liability
provides an incentive to avoid the risk creating activity. Thus, a state might impose strict liability for
scaffold accidents to encourage the use of alternatives to scaffolds. Conversely, a state might reject
· strict liability for scaffolds because it does not want to encourage the use of scaffold alternatives which
it might consider as unsafe or objectionable as scaffolds.
37. SeePosner,supranote IS, at 176-78.
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simply that, as an empirical matter, it does not seem plausible that this is the
purpose behind no-fault plans.
There is another important qualification on the use of intent or purpose-one
cannot assume that because one state's purpose in adopting a rule is loss allocation,
another state's purpose for adopting a different rule is also loss allocation. For
example, even if we are confident that State A's no-fault system is intended to be
loss-allocating, it does not follow that State B 's retention of a negligence system is
not conduct-regulating. On the contrary, it is quite likely that a state would decline
to adopt a no-fault system precisely because of concern about undesirable effects
on conduct.
Intent or purpose is likely to be inconclusive in many, if not most, cases,
leaving many tort rules that can logically be classified as both loss-allocating and
conduct-regulating. There is a second technique that may be used to eliminate some
additional rule from the category of those that are conduct-regulating. This
technique is a process of pragmatic evaluation and is built on the principle that,
although in theory virtually all legal rules affect incentives and conduct, in practice
the conduct effect of two different rules may be quite small. Under this approach,
the court would make a pragmatic assessment of the likely real-world effects under
the different rules that are arguably applicable. To be effective, it will be necessary
to make a relatively particularized comparison. For example, while in some
contexts the difference between a negligence rule and a gross negligence rule may
significantly alter behavior, it may be unlikely to have that effect in the context of
a guest ~tatute. First, a driver has an incentive to protect her own safety. s·econd,
a driver will be liable to non-passengers for her ordinary negligence. The
incremental additional incentive provided by the possibility of liability to
passengers may be negligible. Thus, one could conclude that, as a practical matter,
guest statutes are not conduct regulating. Of course in theory, guest statutes create
incentive for prospective passengers to take greater care in their selection ofdrivers.
One might conclude, nonetheless, that passenger behavior is unlikely to be much
affected by the rule.
As another illustration, one can do a pragmatic evaluation of contributory
versus comparative negligence. Both contributory and comparative negligence are
likely to have conduct effects when contrasted with a rule that puts no responsibility
on the victim. 38 However, when the choice is between these two versions of victim
responsibility, a plausible argument can be made that the conduct-affecting
difference between the two are negligible. As Richard Posner has explained,
"comparative negligence has the same effects on safety as contributory
negligence. " 39 Any differences in conduct under the two systems will be subtle and
tum on the effects on conduct of litigation uncertainty. 40 In light of this, a court
38.

See Posner, supra note 15, at 169.

39. See id. at 171.
40. See id. at 172. Although one empirical study suggests that drivers take less care in
comparative negligence states than in contributory negligence states, a court might conclude differently,
at least as to other types of conduct; see Michelle White, An Empirical Test of the Comparative and
Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law, 20 Rand J. Econ. 308 (1989).
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might reasonably conclude that, from the point of view of conduct regulation, the
differences between comparative and contributory negligence is slight and that the
primary difference is in loss-allocation. 41
There are several limitations to this pragmatic approach. First, courts are
unlikely to have empirical data and, therefore, the analysis is likely to be based on
hunches and unquantifiable assumptions. Still, in some areas involving human
motivation courts may be able to make a reasonable assessment. A second and
greater risk is that courts will attempt an individualized assessment-would this
defendant have behaved differently if the rule had been different? Such an individualized assessment is almost impossible to do in a meaningful way. Imagine
a case of medical malpractice in which the doctor amputates the wrong leg. One
could ask, "If this state permitted higher damage awards, would this doctor have
amputated the correct leg?" Framed this way, the question is unanswerable. The
doctor was surely not doing a cost-benefit calculation at the time she operated. The
appropriate question is not an individualized inquiry but a marginal one. 42 For
example, if higher damages were allowed, insurance companies might insist on
greater precautions or additional training. Higher damage awards might result in
higher malpractice insurance for riskier procedures with the result that doctors
would use lower risk procedures. We cannot know what would have happened in
the particular case and should not try to determine that. Instead, the focus should
be on determining whether a different rule would likely have resulted in different
conduct or precautions being taken by some people impacted by the rule.
A third situation in which tort rules may not be conduct-regulating is the classic
Coase case43 in which the parties have an opportunity to bargain around the rule. 44
In this situation, the legal rule may not. affect conduct but simply reallocate wealth. 4~
Such bargaining is unlikely in cases involving strangers, but may be possible where
there is a prior or on-going relationship. Thus, application of a common domicile
rule may be appropriate in some tort cases involving non-strangers. This principle
could explain the result in Schultz, 46 where the tortfeasor and victim had a
preexisting relationship. It would not justify applying the charitable immunity rule
of a common domicile where the victims happened to be from the same state but
had no relationship.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there may be some limited situations
in which we can reasonably identify some tort rules as loss-allocating and not
41. See Posner, supra note 15, at 172. In a case involving the choice between contributory and
comparative negligence, the New York courts have held that these rules are loss-allocating. See Moon
v. Plymouth Rock Corp., 693 N.Y.S.2d S09, 811 (1999); Armstead v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
954F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Murphyv. Acme Markets, Inc., 650F. Supp. 51,53 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). In contrast, Dean Symeonides has argued that they are conduct-regulating. Symeon
Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in I 999: One More Year, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 143
[text accompanying nn.33-43] (2000).
42. See Trebilock, supra note I 0, at 31.
43. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
44. See Posner, supra note 15, at 49-50.
45. See Michael Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 12 (2d ed. 1989).
46. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
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conduct-regulating. Nonetheless, it is likely that in many, if not most, situations
this will not be possible. Obviously, this creates a problem for a choice of law rule
that requires classification of all tort rules into one category or the other. Arbitrary
labeling is one solution, but an unsatisfactory one. We could also abandon.
completely the distinction, but it would then be necessary to substitute an alternative
rule to guide choice of law in torts. A third option is to retain the distinction, use
the methodology described above to identify some tort rules as loss-allocating, and
treat all other rules as conduct-regulating. The practical effect o{ this may be to
move to a largely territorial choice oflaw rule for torts since most tort rules would
probably be treated as conduct regulating, but I don't view that as an inherently
objectionable result. Indeed, this result is consistent with the standard economic
view that the primary function of tort law is to provide incentives and deterrence for
future behavior.47 Dean Symeonides has argued that "most reasonable people can
agree that conduct-regulating rules are territorially oriented. "48 If one accepts this
position and the standard economic view of torts as primarily conduct-regulating,
then a largely territorial approach to choice oflaw is appropriate. 49
In this paper, I have examined the distinction between loss-allocating and
conduct-regulating tort rules that is embodied in the Louisiana codification as well
as in the judicial practice of other states. I have argued that this distinction is based
on a particular view about tort law and have offered an alternative view, grounded
in standard economic theory. I have attempted to show how this alternative view
impacts on a conflicts rule that is built on the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating
distinction.

See Posner, supra note 15, at 202; Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 135 (1970).
Symeonides, supra note 6, at 705.
49. Interestingly, Judge Posner, one of the leaders of the law and economics movement, has
asserted in a tort choice oflaw case that "(l]aw is largely territorial." Spinozzi v. ITI Sheraton Corp.,
174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999).
47.
48.

